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I. INTRODUCTION

I turned one year old the day after the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education' was announced. I did not hear of the case until many years
later, but I did benefit from it before I learned of its existence. I look at old
yearbooks and see a picture of my third grade class filled with all black
faces. I have often asked myself, "Why is it wrong to have a class of all
black children and black teachers?" I did not see the yearbooks for the
white schools in town, but I presume all the faces in them were white.
While I never asked what was wrong with that picture, I have pondered the
former question most of my adult life. This Article attempts to answer

* Dickason Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. This Article is
dedicated to my daughters Eryn and Amber who attended predominantly white schools and my son
Justin who attends or has attended predominantly white or predominantly Hispanic schools.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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both. Anecdotes from past, along with applicable case law will be used to
answer the questions raised by this Article.
The picture of the classrooms changed before I ever noticed them. My
parents' generation born in the first two decades of the twentieth century
ushered in a season of dramatic changes that seemed like the slow tide of
progress to mine. When the school board in Tarboro, North Carolina
adopted a freedom of choice plan, my mother decided to send me and my
siblings to the white schools. We were not the first black family to attend
the white schools, but we were among the first. As I recall, my two
younger brothers attended the white elementary and junior high schools.2
I started ninth grade at the white Ahoskie High School and Selma High
School in Johnston County for tenth grade. I attended both under freedom
of choice plans.3 I finished my last two years at the consolidated Bertie
Senior High School.
The dramatic changes that I observed did not miraculously occur. The
U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Brown that the black students attending
schools designated for blacks in segregated school systems were deprived
of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 4 Unbeknownst to me, my school district was in violation of
the Constitution. In Brown II,5 the Court remanded the case to the district
court to fashion remedies to admit black students "to public schools on a
racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed." 6 But, my
school district had not complied by the time I attended sixth grade in 1964.
I recall hearing about the freedom of choice option by eighth grade.
I did not know then that civil rights lawyers and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) were vigorously trying to implement Brown7 throughout
North Carolina. That litigation involved my school districts and cases for

2. One of my younger brothers recalls writing President Lyndon B. Johnson for permission
to attend the white school. He also recalls receiving a letter from President Johnson but does not
recall its contents.
3. See Eileen M. Fava, Desegregationand ParentalChoice in PublicSchooling: A Legal
Analysis of Controlled Choice Student Assignment Plans, 11 B.C., THIRD WoRLD L.J. 83, 83-84
(1991). Under freedom of choice plans, school districts permitted students to attend any school of
their level within the school district. Before the adoption of these plans students attended a school
within the district designated for students of their race. School districts were organized by
municipality or county. Schools of the same level designated for blacks or whites were within close
proximity of each other. Id.
4. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
5. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The Court required reargument on the
remedies for the constitutional violations it found. Id. at 298.
6. Id.at 301.
7. Brown, 347 U.S. at 483.
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Bertie and Johnston Counties were among those published in the
reporters.' These cases reveal that the government and civil rights lawyers
relentlessly tried to destroy the picture I had grown accustomed to in order
to create a new picture full of black and white faces.
Godwin v. Johnston County Boardof Education9 was filed on April 4,
1968, in the spring before I attended Selma High School.' ° Under the
freedom of choice plan used in Selma, a substantial number of blacks
attended junior high school at the white school but only a handful attended
grades nine through twelve. I was the only black student in the tenth grade.
Most black high school students continued to attend the all black Richard
B. Harrison High School. In his lawsuit, Godwin challenged the pace of
integration." He sued the school board as well as the State Board of
Education and the State Superintendent. 2 The black and white high
schools in Selma and Smithfield were expected to be consolidated by fall
1969. In fact, I was supposed to attend Smithfield-Selma High School had
I remained in Johnston County. The major consequence of the court's
ruling in Godwin was that the duty to desegregate was not placed solely on
county boards of education; the state school board also had a duty to
desegregate the school systems across the state.13 Thus, the state had a duty
to make county school boards change those pictures.4
In UnitedStates v. Bertie County BoardofEducation, the school board
attempted to comply with the mandate of Brown by implementing a
freedom of choice plan. This plan placed approximately 9% of black
students in the county in previously all white schools, and no white
students would attend the schools historically maintained for blacks. 5 The
allocation of teachers was similar to the placement of the students. Nine
of 149 black teachers were to be assigned to white schools and 16 of 103

8. See Godwin v. Johnston County Bd. of Educ., 301 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D.N.C. 1969); see
also United States v. Bertie County Bd. of Educ., 293 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D.N.C. 1968).
9. Godwin, 301 F. Supp. at 1339.
10. See Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92, 102 (D.D.C. 1973). The Tarboro School
District was deemed by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to be in presumptive
violation of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it had failed to submit an acceptable
desegregation plan by 1973. See id.
11. See Godwin, 301 F. Supp. at 1339-41.
12. Id. at 1339.
13. Id. at 1343.
14. Id.
15. United States v. Bertie County Bd. of Educ., 293 F. Supp. 1276, 1278 (E.D.N.C. 1968).
School boards abolished the formal racial classifications of schools and adopted plans giving
students the right to choose which school to attend. Id. at 1277-78.
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white teachers were to be assigned to black schools. 6 Thus, the school
board proposed to maintain a predominantly white high school and an all
black high school. 7 The court rejected this plan and ordered the school
board to consolidate the high school by 1968. All
other schools would be
8
fully integrated by the 1969-70 academic year.'
The Bertie case is still alive today' 9 because one elementary school in
the county is still identifiable as a white school.2 ° The DOJ is pressing the
county to come up with a plan to eliminate all racially identifiable schools
in its system.2 ' The county recently held a public hearing to discuss its
proposal to build a new centralized middle school and convert a junior
high school into a centralized elementary school.22 In 1968, the school
board argued that whites would flee a unitary school system, 23 and that
prediction proved true.24 Whites in Bertie County left the public school
system for private schools, resulting in the student bodies of all schools in
Bertie County except Askewville Elementary being predominantly black.
Notwithstanding the student bodies, white teachers comprise a larger
proportion of the total number of teachers than the proportion of white
students.26
This Article will discuss an eyewitness's analysis of events and
circumstances surrounding cases involving the desegregation and
integration of schools and colleges. For more than fifty years, Americans
have litigated on the racial composition of schools at all levels of the
educational system. That litigation has pursued remedies based on the
notion that the ideal picture of equality was one that was racially

16. Id. at 1278.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1283.
19. United States v. Bertie County Bd. of Educ., 319 F. Supp. 2d 669 (E.D.N.C. 2004).
20. Id. at 670.
21. Cal Bryant, Citizensprotest school closings, ROANOKE-CHOWAN NEwS-HERALD, Dec.
2, 2004, availableat www.roanoke-chowannewsherald.com/articles/2004/12/02/news/news2.txt
(last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
22. Id.
23. Bertie County Bd. ofEduc., 293 F. Supp. at 1280 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S.
294, 300 (1955)).
24. See Bertie County Bd. of Educ., 319 F. Supp. at 670.
25. See id. Blacks now comprise 82% of the high school student body and whites 17%. At
Askewville Elementary blacks comprise 24% of the student body and whites 72%. Bertie High
School Overview, Greatschools.net, availableat http://greatschools.net/modper/browseschool/
nc/276 (last visited June 7, 2005); Askewville Elementary School Overview, Greatschools.net,
available at http://greatschools.net/modperl/browse-school/nc/274 (last visited June 7, 2005).
26. See, e.g., Todd Silberman, School PlanRiles Bertie Parents,NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb.
21, 2005, at BI.
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integrated. A picture with only blacks or with persons of color was not
equal to a picture with all whites or a racially integrated picture that is
predominantly white. The DOJ has pursued a strategy attempting to delink
the categorization of schools from their racial composition and transform
them into "Just schools" without success. Black plaintiffs have sought to
integrate white schools and to equalize funding for black schools while
white plaintiffs and defendants have fought integration and equal funding.
The pictures matter but the cloud of Plessy v. Ferguson27 and the separate
but equal doctrine in American consciousness, 28 has made the public
uncomfortable with evaluating the pictures and the courts are afraid to
embrace the relative values of the those pictures. The pictures matter
because people still make choices on whether to attend or send their
children to an educational institution based on those pictures. Part II of this
Article examines the efforts to desegregate elementary and secondary
schools systems.29 Part 1II of this Article examines the efforts in the dual
systems of higher education in southern states. 3' Finally, Part IV examines
affirmative action and the creation of new pictures in colleges and
universities in the era of integration.3
II. THE PICTURE IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS AND
FREEDOM OF CHOICE

A. The Picture
Something was wrong with the picture of my third grade class, but it
was not readily apparent. On the surface, the boys wore suits and the girls
were clad in skirts and dresses. Everyone was neat and well-groomed. The
teacher was talking to a student. The walls were adorned with posters and
schoolwork. The teacher-student ratio was too high, but there was order in

27. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
28. One commentator argues that the Court was influenced by the proposition that
segregation resulted in psychic harm to blacks and directed courts to develop remedies to that harm
without regard to the harm suffered by whites. Kevin Brown, The Road Not Taken in Brown:
Recognizing the DualHarm of Segregation,90 VA. L. REv. 1579 (2004). However, Brown flowed
directly from a definition of racial equality as it was understood at the adoption of the Civil War
Amendments. That is, the treatment of whites constituted the standard of equality and the treatment
of other racial groups was to be measured by it. Blacks were harmed by segregation but the
principle harm was not psychic.
29. See infra Part II.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Part IV.
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the classroom and the students appear engaged. I have fond memories of
third grade. I remember it as a year of great learning. I had not thought
there was anything wrong with this picture until I studied the implications
of Brown.3 2 While I have recognized that Brown was necessary, I have
resented the implication that blacks could not learn unless whites were in
the picture.
Even the picture of equality expressed in Martin Luther King's famous
I Have a Dream speech was clearly multiracial, unlike the picture of my
classroom.
I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the
true meaning of its creed: "We hold these truths to be self-evident:
that all men are created equal." . . . I have a dream that my four
children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged
by the color of their skin but by the content of their character. I
have a dream today.
I have a dream that one day... little black boys and black girls will
be able to join hands with little white boys and white girls and walk
together as sisters and brothers.33
Implicit in his vision was that a scene of little black boys and girls joining
hands was not equal to the vision in which they joined hands with white
children.34 Martin Luther King Jr.'s dream appears to have implied little
about the pictures of the schools with all white faces, except that a picture
full of multiracial faces was preferred to any that lacked such diversity.35
You could not tell what was wrong with the picture of my class merely
by examining it. You would have to look at the pictures of all the schools
to understand the role that the law played in creating those pictures. In
society's eyes, the children in my class picture were not equal to those in
white school yearbooks. The inequality was created by something that was
not necessarily visible in any picture. The condition of the buildings or the
age of the books, supplies and equipment compared to those of the all
white schools was not visible. Furthermore, the Bertie County court
specifically found that the facilities at the historically black schools were

32.
33.
17, 2005,
34.
35.

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have A Dream (Aug. 28, 1963), BANGOR DALY NEWS, Jan.
at 6.
See id.
See id.
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substantially inferior to the historically white schools.36 Society associated
classrooms full of black faces with inferior facilities, outdated books and
teachers many of whom were not deemed worthy to teach white students.37
Brown rests, however, on a different association, one greater in
magnitude and more pernicious in its effect.3" If it were not so, the defects
could have been remedied by the equalization of financing pursuant to the
39 It is clear from the
separate but equal principle of Plessy v. Ferguson.
range of cases consolidated in Brown that the disparate condition of the
school systems was not the principal harm.40 In Brown, the trial court
explicitly found that schools in the Topeka system were treated equally in
funding and condition.' In Briggs v. Elliott, the trial court had found that
the school district was equalizing its treatment of its two school systems.42
Brown thus is premised on a deeply entrenched societal view that the color
of the students in the picture determined the quality of the education
received by, and the caliber of, those students. 4 The Jim Crow laws did
not merely render us "separate and unequal"; they cast us as "black and
inferior." Consequently, the Court explicitly acknowledged that the deeper
44
association could not be remedied by mere equalization of the schools.
Implicit in Brown was the notion that there was nothing wrong with the
all black picture I had not questioned. 45 The law created those segregated
pictures. The remedy in Brown II is predicated on the harm caused to black
students because of the creation and maintenance of the two separate
pictures by the state.4 6 The Court presumes that the deep societal
association flowing from state action will be remedied by modifying the
pictures in the white schools and destroying the all black picture.47
The way to destroy the all black picture and modify the all white
picture was to dismantle the racially dual system and establish a racially
36. United States v. Bertie County Bd. of Educ., 293 F. Supp. 1276,1279 (E.D.N.C. 1968).
37. Id.
38. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
39. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
40. Brown, 347 U.S. at 486.
41. Id. at486n.1.
42. Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F. Supp. 920, 921 (E.D.S.C. 1952).
43. See generally Brown, 347 U.S. at 486.
44. Id. at 494. The Court quoted the Kansas trial court that had a found a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment even though the schools had been treated equally. "Segregation of white
and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The
impact is greater when it has the sanction of law; for the policy of separating the races is usually
interpreted as denoting inferiority of the Negro group." Id.
45. See id.
46. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
47. See id.
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unitary system. Such a school system would reflect the image in Dr.
King's dream and would be attained through the removal of the legal
barriers preventing their existence. Since the state statutes and
constitutional provisions were declared unconstitutional in Brown,
recalcitrant school boards attempted to achieve a racially unitary system
through freedom of choice plans.48 Theoretically, these plans would lead
to racially mixed schools because students and their families could choose
any school at their level within the district. Whatever pictures emerged
would be the result of the choices of students and their families rather than
ones dictated by state law or the school board. The school boards offered
black students the opportunity to choose better-financed and wellmaintained schools which were previously limited to white students.
Presumably most black students could be expected to choose these
schools.
B. Freedom of Choice Litigation in My Backyard
Freedom of choice plans have a storied history in post-Brown
desegregation litigation. In particular, in North Carolina, these plans did
not generate expected results. While freedom of choice plans modified the
pictures in white schools, they did not destroy the black picture. No white
students elected to attend the schools previously restricted to blacks and
most blacks elected to remain in those schools.49 The failure of the
freedom of choice theory in practice resulted in several published opinions
involving school districts in North Carolina.5"
In Boomer v. Beaufort County Boardof Education,5" the district court
rejected a freedom of choice plan submitted by the school board to cover
the 1968-69 school year.52 The school district operated 10 schools
containing 2853 white students, 2417 black students, 123 white teachers
and 85 black teachers.53 The district court had previously approved
freedom of choice plans.5 4 However, by the 1968-69 year only 128 black
students had requested to be assigned to white schools, but no white
students had requested to be assigned to black schools.55 Two white
teachers had been assigned to black schools, but no black teachers had

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See supra text accompanying note 5.
See infra text accompanying notes 51, 58, 67 and cases cited.
See id.
294 F. Supp. 179 (E.D.N.C. 1968).
Id. at 181.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 182.
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been assigned to white schools.56 The district court noted that the all black
schools would remain all black under the plan.57 The exercise of choice by
black and white students had slightly changed the pictures in the white
schools but had failed to change the pictures in the county's black schools.
In Teel v. Pitt County Board of Education,58 the school system was
comprised of 8656 black students and 6261 white students. 9 The school
board adopted a freedom of choice plan for the 1965-66 school year, but
only 250 black students requested to be assigned to white schools.6 ° In the
following year, perhaps due to intimidation, more than half of those that
had been assigned to white schools requested to transfer back to the black
schools. 61 Black families' choices were being influenced by coercive
forces. If black students chose to attend the white school, the families
risked the safety of their children.62 However, the plaintiffs continued to
pursue the equality promised by Brown.63 The district court nevertheless
permitted the school board to continue a modified freedom of choice plan
for the 1967-68 school year.' The district court was concerned that the
number of black students requesting a transfer to white schools had
decreased, but felt that the plan might work if flaws in the original plan
were eliminated. 65 The most significant flaw was that the school district
automatically reassigned students who chose to return to the school they
previously attended.66
The use of violence to influence the choice of black families was
commonplace. In Singleton v. Anson County Board of Education,67 the
district court ordered the school district to take further steps to eliminate
racially identifiable schools and to provide equal educational facilities.68
The school district adopted a freedom of choice plan that resulted in the
partial integration of seven of the fourteen schools in the district. 69 As a
result, some schools were predominately attended and staffed by whites

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Boomer, 294 F. Supp. at 181.
Id.
272 F. Supp. 703 (E.D.N.C. 1967).
Id. at 705.
Id.
Id. at 705-06.
See id.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Teel, 272 F. Supp. at 707.
Id. at 706.
Id. at 707.
283 F. Supp. 895 (W.D.N.C. 1968).
Id. at901.
Id. at 898.
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and other schools were exclusively attended and predominantly staffed by
blacks.7 ° The district court also found that black families who elected to
attend the white schools had been subjected to acts of violence, including
bombings and shootings. 7'
In Coppedgev. FranklinCounty BoardofEducation,72 another freedom
of choice plan failed to achieve unitary status due to threats of violence
against black parents and bureaucracy in the school board.73 The school
board had only proposed to assign 750 out of approximately 3200 black
students to white schools. 74 The court focused on the school board's role
in providing choice. 75 Accordingly, the appellate court upheld the lower
court's ruling for the school board to establish a unitary school system by
the 1968-69 school year without further delay.76
Since freedom of choice plans were not bringing about the desired
compliance with the Brown mandate, other remedies were required. The
burden was initially placed on the school districts to devise a solution to
change the racial composition of schools.7 7 In Nesbit v. Statesville City
Board of Education,8 the appeals involving several school districts in
North Carolina and one in Virginia were consolidated. 79 The school
districts were ordered to terminate their dual systems immediately and
thereafter to operate only a unitary system. 0 The school districts were
required to adopt plans eliminating the racial characteristics of their
schools including their student bodies and faculties.8 '
In United States v. Jones County Board of Education,s2 the district
court approved a desegregation plan that called for the pairing of
elementary and junior high schools in close proximity during the 1968-69
school year. Also, the plan would reorganize the entire school system in
1969-70 by pairing schools in primary, intermediate and junior high.

70. Id. at 900-01.
71. Id. at 901.
72. 404 F.2d 1177 (4th Cir. 1968).
73. Id. at 1178.
74. Id.
75. See generally id.(finding that defendants' appeal was made most by their compliance).
76. Id. at 1178. This was the second time the case had been before the U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. See Coppedge v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 394 F.2d 410 (4th
Cir. 1968).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 78, 82, 86 and cases cited.
78. 418 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1969).
79. Id. at 1041.
80. Id. at 1041-42 (citing Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969)).
81. Id. at 1042.
82. 295 F. Supp. 640 (E.D.N.C. 1968).
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Furthermore, the plan would convert the black high school to the junior
high school and the white high school to the senior high school.83 The goal
was to eliminate student choice and place the school assignments in the
hands of the school district.84 Whereas previously the school districts had
assigned students by race, now they were to assign students without regard
to race.85
In Felderv. HarnettCounty BoardofEducation,86 the lower court held
that the freedom of choice plan promulgated by the school board in 1964
had failed to achieve unitary status.8 Initially the plan applied to only four
grades,88 although approximately 6000 of the 13000 students in the school
system were black.89 By the 1967-68 school term, less than 200 blacks
were attending previously all white schools. 9 Although, the picture in the
white schools had been slightly modified, the picture in the black schools
remained the same. 9' Therefore, some other measure was needed to
produce a greater change. When the school board proposed to close the
three black high schools and reassign their students to all white high
schools, the court required the school board to-adopt a plan which covered
elementary and secondary schools as well.92 Most striking about the plan
was that the black schools were going to be closed and black students were
going to be involuntarily assigned to predominantly white schools.9 3
The school district's compliance with desegregation orders was met
with resistance. Students, black and white, had to be assigned to schools
that they had not been assigned to before. In Huggins v. Wake County
Boardof Education,94 the school board assigned all students in grades ten
through twelve, regardless of race, to their previously designated white
high school and all ninth graders to their previously designated black high
school.95 The parents of children who had not attended the black school
before sought to enjoin the reorganization. 96

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 641.
See id.
See id.
409 F.2d 1070 (4th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 1071.
Id. at 1072.
Id. at 1071.
Id. at 1072.
Felder, 409 F.2d at 1072.
Id.
Id.
157 S.E.2d 703 (N.C. 1967).
Id. at 707.
Id. at 704.
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Given the inadequate facilities of most of the black schools and the
limited size of white schools, new schools had to be constructed. The new
construction required issuing bonds that could have required voter
approval. In Dilday v. Beaufort County Board of Education,97 voters
approved the issuance of bonds to construct a new high school for white
students and repairs for the two black schools. 98 Acting on advice that the
proposed construction was unconstitutional, the school board modified the
plan to construct a larger high school even though the bond issuance was
insufficient to finance the revised plan.99 A taxpayer lawsuit successfully
challenged the proposed modification.l°°
C. The Teachers in the Picture
Most of the controversy in school desegregation cases in popular
consciousness has related to the color of students in the classroom picture.
However, the teacher in my picture was black. While students may have
lamented the forced disruption in their schooling, courts have not focused
on removing black teachers from the picture. Their place in the picture,
however, was the subject of substantial litigation.' Freedom of choice
plans were designed to permit black students to leave all black schools to
attend white schools.' 02 The impact on black teachers was not discussed in
Brown, and still appears to have been an afterthought.0 3 For example, in
Chambersv. Hendersonville City BoardofEducation,'" the school district
fully integrated students for the 1965-66 school year; 0 5 however, it only
offered employment in these integrated schools to eight of twenty-four
black teachers. Meanwhile, every white teacher in the previously dual
system was offered reemployment, and the school district even hired an
additional fourteen white teachers. 10 6 The school district took the position
that when the black students moved to the white school, the teachers at the
black schools lost their jobs and had to compete with new applicants for
openings at the white schools.'0 7

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

161 S.E.2d 108 (1968).
Id. at 114.
Id. at 113-14.
Seeid.at 113.
See infra text accompanying notes 104, 108, 114, 123-25 and cases cited.
See Fava, supra note 3, at 83.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 190.
Id.
Id. at 191.
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In Teel v. Pitt County BoardofEducation,108 teacher assignments were
included as a part of the freedom of choice plan.° 9 Under the freedom of
choice plan, teachers were assigned to schools based solely upon merit."' 0
As a result of this policy, seventeen white teachers were assigned to black
schools and two black librarians were assigned to white schools."' This
configuration occurred even though fifty new teachers were hired, half of
whom were white." 2 The Teel court also required the school district to
devise a plan to desegregate the faculty as well." 3
The issue of discriminatory teacher assignments was also raised in
Buford v. Morganton City Board of Education."4 The Morganton City
school district operated two all black schools, hiring a total of twenty-six
black teachers." 5 The school district achieved integration at the student
level by refusing to assign black students from other districts thus reducing
the number ofblack students." 6 Furthermore, the school district converted
one of the black schools into a predominantly white school for the 1965-66
school year." 7 The school district then rehired only twelve black
teachers." 8 The court observed that prior to desegregation, black teachers
were not required to compete with white teachers." 9 The Buford court
ruled against the black teachers because they had not proven that the black
teachers who were not rehired were better qualified than the white teachers
who were hired.'20
Black teachers were therefore forced to resort to litigation in an attempt
to preserve their jobs in the school system. In Johnson v. Branch, white
teachers and school districts were forced to include black teachers in
desegregation plans as school districts moved toward a racially unitary
status. 2' In Felder v. Harnett County Board of Education,'22 the school
district was ordered not to discriminate in the assignment of teachers and
108. 272 F. Supp. 703 (E.D.N.C. 1967).
109. Id. at 708.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Teel, 272 F. Supp. at 708.
114. 244 F. Supp. 437, 445 (W.D.N.C. 1965).
115. Id. at439.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.at 439.
119. Buford, 244 F. Supp. at 439.
120. Id. at 443.
121. See Johnson v. Branch, 242 F. Supp. 721, 723 (E.D.N.C. 1965) (a black teacher was not
rehired as retaliation for her involvement in the Civil Rights Movement).
122. 409 F.2d 1070 (4th Cir. 1969).
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administrators.' The failure to retain black teachers in desegregation
plans in North Carolina reached the Fourth Circuit on three occasions.' 24
In Wheeler v. Durham City Board of Education,'25 the circuit court
addressed teacher assignments.'26 The circuit court previously rejected a
freedom of choice plan and remanded the case.'27 The school district
insisted upon continuing to "employ the best qualified available Negro
teachers for schools attended by Negro pupils, and the best qualified white
teachers for schools attended solely or predominantly by white pupils."' 2 8
The circuit court, citing Bradley v. School BoardofRichmond,'29 held that
"removal of race considerations from faculty selection and allocation is,
as a matter of law, an inseparable and indispensable command within the
abolition of pupil segregation in public schools."' 3 °
In Wall v. Stanley County Board of Education,"' the school board
adopted a freedom of choice plan for pupil assignments for the 1965-66
school year.' 32 The school district was 15% black and 300 black students
were assigned to white schools.'33 As a result of the shift of black students
to white schools, the number of students in the black schools decreased
and the number of teachers required for those schools also decreased.' 34
Prior to January 1966, no black teacher had ever been assigned to teach
white students.'35 Consequently, a black teacher with thirteen years
teaching experience, who was recommended for reemployment by her
principal for the 1965-66 school year, was not offered employment. 36 The
circuit court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the
assignment of teachers based upon race.' 37 The school board was
38
unconstitutionally assigning black teachers to teach only black students.1

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 1072.
See infra text accompanying notes 125, 131, 140 and cases cited.
363 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 739.
Id.
Id. at 739-40.
382 U.S. 103 (1965).
Wheeler, 363 F.2d at 740.
378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967).
Id. at277.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wall, 378 F.2d at 276-77.
Id. at 276.
Id.
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The issue was a statewide problem and the black teachers' cause of
action was taken up by the North Carolina Teachers Association. 39 In
North Carolina Teachers Association v. Asheboro City Board of
Education,140 nine black teachers were not reemployed as the school
district began taking steps to dismantle its dual school system. 4 ' Prior to
the 1965-66 school year, the school district operated nine schools. 142 All
black students were assigned to a school consisting of grades one through
twelve. 143 White students were assigned to other schools consisting of five
elementary schools, two junior high schools and one high school.'" The
school district adopted a desegregation plan in 1965, in which the black
high school was to be converted to an elementary school and its faculty
reduced from twenty-four to eleven. 14 However, the faculty at white
schools increased and thirty-five new teachers were hired, 14 6 while the total
number of teachers was reduced by three. 47 Black teachers bore the brunt
of the attrition and sued. 148 The circuit court held that the school district
denied black teachers the equal protection
of the laws when it required
49
them to compete with new applicants.
D. The Freedom of Choice Paradox
Freedom of choice plans failed to change school systems to prevent the
constitutional violations condemned in Brown. 50 The most significant
failure was its inability to bring about racially unitary school systems, as
all black schools remained. Under freedom of choice plans, the picture did
change for the historically white schools, even if only modestly. A
significant number of blacks chose to attend those schools. However, the
picture did not change significantly for the historically black schools. A
few white teachers were assigned to the black schools, but no white
students chose to attend them.' 5 ' There was something wrong with the
picture in which students were all black. Courts consistently held that
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See N.C. Teachers Ass'n v. Asheboro City Bd. of Educ., 393 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1968).
Id.
Id. at 739.
Id.
Id.
N.C. TeachersAss'n, 393 F.2d at 739.
Id. at 739-40.
Id. at 740.
Id.
See id. at 736.
N.C. Teachers Ass'n, 393 F.2d. at 743.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1966).
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remedial methods that left black schools in place were not sufficient to
comply with the constitutional mandate of Brown.'52 Clearly, the picture
of a classroom composed of only black students was not equal to one with
only whites students, or one with a majority of white students and a few
black students.
The permissibility of existing classroom compositions as a remedy for
Brown violations was reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1968.153 In
Green v. County School Board,'54 the Court held that using freedom of
choice plans to achieve desegregation was not permissible unless it
"promises meaningful and immediate progress towards disestablishing
state imposed segregation and promptly converting a school system into
one without 'white' schools or 'Negro,' schools but just schools."' 55 The
specific evil that freedom of choice plans addressed was the system in
56
which states designated schools for students based upon their skin color. 1
Freedom of choice plans technically accomplished that goal as states
removed the official white or negro designation, but placed the burden of
removing the historical racial character of the schools on students and their
families.'57 The pictures would change only if individuals chose to make
different pictures.
The focus on "choice" emphasized the decisions of black and white
students, rather than the options provided by the state. Prior to Brown,
states with dual school systems provided students with only one option for
a public education.158 Education was mandatory through age sixteen, so all
students were compelled to attend school. Students could choose private
59
schools, but private schools in the South tended to be segregated as well. 1'
The only public school option was the racially designated school. The
schools designated for whites were better financed and maintained.160 The
facilities were good and the books were current. The state employed
teachers they thought were well qualified. Students and teachers came
from the same or similar communities. Both groups had high expectations
of white students and low expectations of the black students in schools on
the other side of town. They could be expected, along with their families,

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See Brown, 347 U.S. at 483.
See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
Id.
Id. at439-42.
See id.at 430.
See id.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
See United States v. Bertie County Bd. of Educ., 293 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D.N.C. 1968).
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to object to the presence of black students and to offer an environment
hostile to blacks.
The schools designated for blacks were given substantially less
financing and their facilities were inadequate. Furthermore, the school
district labeled the teachers at the black schools as less qualified than the
teachers at the white schools. 6 ' However, whatever the teachers may have
lacked in qualifications, they possessed in love. The teachers had high
expectations for their students and provided them with encouragement.
Under the freedom of choice plans, black and white students were
offered those two options. It is understandable that no whites chose to
attend the black schools and that many blacks choose to stay in the black
schools. It was reasonable for school boards to anticipate the continuation
of black schools. Regardless of what may have been wrong with an all
black picture, school boards expected that picture to remain. If a freedom
of choice plan was designed so that the blacks would choose the white
school in significant numbers, whites would desert the public schools for
private schools. The same result would occur if the state offered only one
option without choice. Put another way, if the state provided whites only
with the option of attending schools with a large number of black students,
they would opt out of the public schools. Consequently, the public school
system would be a unitary system that would be predominantly black. The
private schools would be predominantly white. The pictures would change
only slightly if the DOJ and civil rights lawyers prevailed. If the school
district prevailed, the pictures in the white schools would change modestly
and the all black picture would remain unchanged.
162
The all black picture existed in 1963 because of Plessy v. Ferguson
and the separate but equal doctrine. 163 But for Plessy, freedom of choice
would have existed in the public school systems of the South and the
pictures in the schools would have likely resembled those under the postBrown freedom of choice plans."6 There would have been schools that
were exclusively black and schools with a majority of white students and
a significant number of black students. The majority in Plessy apparently
would have objected to a picture of a school with any degree of
integration, no matter how significant. 65 Why? What was so threatening
about the picture of moderately integrated schools that even these schools
could not exist? Perhaps the answer lies in the impact of the resulting
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pictures on racial equality.
What was racial equality when Plessy v.
166
Ferguson was decided?
The premise of the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson167 was that racial
equality had been attained between blacks and whites. 168 The separation of
blacks and whites had no bearing on their equality. 169 Any inequality that
existed was only in the minds of blacks. 7 ' In his famous dissent, Justice
Harlan took issue with this absurd proposition arguing that the purpose and
inherent effect of the Jim Crow laws was not merely to afford blacks less
rights than those accorded to whites, but to proclaim blacks and whites
unequal. 7 ' Notwithstanding the muddled reasoning of the majority, the
measure of equality at the time of Plessy was tied to the treatment of
whites.' 72 Plessy, a very light skinned black man, demanded to be treated
as a white person.'73 Plessy's belief that he was entitled to privileges
because he was part white was tied to a venerable history in American
political discourse and jurisprudence. Although the Civil War
Amendments' 74 are race neutral in language,' 75 the Civil Rights Act of
1866 established the rights of whites as the benchmark of equality.'76
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as
is enjoyed by white citizens,...177
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was intended to invalidate the Black Codes
adopted by a number of Southern states in the wake of the Civil War in an
attempt to preserve slavery de facto. Those Codes imposed legal
disadvantages on blacks that were not imposed on whites. Furthermore, the
166. Id.at 537.
167. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537.
168. See id. at 544.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 551.
171. Id. at 556-57 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
172. See generally Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537.
173. Id.at 541.
174. See U.S. CONT. amend. XIV; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
175. In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court noted that the framers of the
amendments intended to protect the freed slaves. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36,71-72 (1872).
176. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was revised in the Civil Rights Act of 1870, now codified
at42 U.S.C. § 1981.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
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impairment of contract, property and legal rights amounted to a tax on
blacks not imposed on whites. In the language of the Act, Congress
recognized that white skin had value.'78
Contrary to the majority's assertions, the purpose of the Jim Crow laws
sanctioned in Plessy was to preserve the superior position of whites. 79
Justice Harlan had it right, however he thought that the Jim Crow laws
were unnecessary to preserve the position of whites because of their
inherent superiority. 8 ' Shaped out of the bosom of slavery,' 8 ' the Jim
Crow laws dictated the picture in both classrooms. The separate but equal
doctrine erected a barrier physically separating blacks from others, through
a system of discriminatory refusals. 2 Further, it strengthened the barrier
between whites and blacks by enhancing the white people's access to
resources and relationships necessary for educational, career and economic
success, while greatly limiting or depriving blacks of such access. Perhaps,
the most enduring legacy of the Jim Crow laws was their association of
black skin with inferiority.8 3 It created the picture that blacks were not
merely unequal, but inferior.
Education is one of the principal areas in which the systemic
advantages of whites and disadvantages of blacks occurred. Blacks were
denied access to educational resources and were given less educational
preparation for their future success.' 84 Blacks were taught by teachers and
professors educated in disadvantaged schools. They were asked to compete
with white students who were given a superior quality of education since
kindergarten, and who were taught by teachers who had been educated in
advantaged schools.
Even if blacks overcame the disadvantages or grew up with the same
advantages as whites, they would still face bias because of the picture the
school system gave to the world. The school system associated black skin
with inferiority and white skin with superiority. An examination of
education institutions at every level would reveal that black schools had
poorer quality facilities, fewer course offerings, older and outdated
178. See id.
179. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
181. See id. at 559-60 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
182. See generally id. at 537.
183. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 404, 407 (1856). In Scott, Justice Taney predated the
association of blacks with inferiority to before the adoption of the U.S. Constitution. Justice Taney
stated that the association was strongly engrained in English culture. Id. at 407-08.
184. See United States v. Bertie County Bd. of Educ., 293 F. Supp. 1276 (1960).
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textbooks and less money than white schools.'85 However, eliminating
racial advantages and disadvantages today does not undo the advantages
and disadvantages of the past that flow to future generations. Brown
sought to remedy this history by addressing the pictures in each
classroom. 18 6 Ifthe pictures were destroyed, the deep feelings of inferiority
that rendered blacks and whites inherently unequal would dissipate as
well. This premise has clouded the subsequent Brown jurisprudence.
E. Hispanics and Freedom of Choice
Though racial discourse in the United States tends to revolve around a
black and white axis, the discussion has broadened in the contemporary
era. 187 My wife's experience in Corpus Christi, Texas leads me to ask
whether equality is all about color. Mexican-Americans comprised the
largest minority group in my wife's school district. However, MexicanAmericans were classified as white. In Cisneros v. Corpus Christi
Independent School District,188 Mexican-Americans, regardless of skin
color, were classified as "White: Spanish Surnamed."18 9 My wife had
always thought she went to an integrated school. She had heard that
Corpus Christi had complied with Brown very quickly after it was decided.
If so, Corpus Christi did so using a technique commonly employed in the
southwestern United States by school districts with substantial Hispanic
populations. 190 The city integrated blacks with Mexican-Americans who
were officially classified as "white," albeit with the colon.191 The student
body at my wife's school, Roy Miller High School, was comprised of
more than sixty-five percent of White: Spanish Surnamed students.
Her different experience meant that the color of the faces in her
classroom were different from those in mine. The majority of the faces
were Mexican-American. The Cisneros court held that Brown prohibited

185. Seeid.
186. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
187. The issue has always been broader. The language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was not
limited to blacks, and in Plessy, the majority also discussed Mexican peonage and the Chinese
coolie trade. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542.
188. 324 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
189. Id.at 602 n. 1.
190. Steven H. Wilson, Brown Over "Other White": Mexican Americans'LegalArguments
andLitigation Strategy in School DesegregationLawsuits, 21 LAw & HIST. REv. 145, 178 (2003).
191. Id.; see also Margaret E. Montoya, A BriefHistory of ChicanaloSchool Segregation:One
Rationalefor Affirmative Action, 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 159, 162-63 (2001).
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a picture comprised exclusively of Mexican-Americans. 92
' The immediate
result was a freedom of choice plan as my wife recalls, in which students
were given the right to attend any high school, including the newly
constructed Ray High School.
The faces were different but the issue was similar. The Cisneros court
indicated that a picture comprised of a majority of Mexican-Americans
and a few black students was not equal to one comprised of a substantial
majority of white students.' 93 Furthermore, in Keyes v. Denver School
District No. j,194 black plaintiffs argued that the schools with mostly
brown and black students were not equal to the schools with almost all
white faces.' 95
Despite the litigation, the inequalities remain; the picture of my
classroom still exists. Schools are nearly as segregated today as they were
when I was in high school.' 96 Resisting consolidation, the school board in
Bertie County argued that white parents who are still free to choose private
schools would flee public schools.1 97 Following the decision in Bertie
County, white parents did what the school board predicted. Currently, 82%
of the student body in Bertie County is black.' 98 At Roy Miller High
School, the student body is 82% Hispanic and 12% African-American. 99
Contemporary Brown jurisprudence has forgotten the deep association that
rendered segregation inherently unequal.2"0
The picture continues to exist but the state's role in creating the picture
is the focus of constitutional doctrine.20 ' The school board may now argue,
as the State of Mississippi unsuccessfully did in Ayers v. Allain, °2 that the

192. Cisneros, 324 F. Supp. at 604.
193. See id. at 599.
194. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
195. See id. at 196.
196. See United States v. Bertie County Bd. of Educ., 319 F.Supp. 2d 669 (E.D.N.C. 2004);
see also Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King's Dream or Plessy's Nightmare,
availableathttp://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg04/resegregation04.php (last
visited June 7, 2005).
197. See United States v. Bertie County Bd. of Educ., 293 F. Supp. 1276, 1280 (1968) (citing
Monroe v. Bd. of Comm'r, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968)).
198. Bertie High School Overview, supra note 25.
199. Miller High School Center for Communication & Technical, Greatschools.net, available
at http://www.greatschools.net/cgi-bin/tx/other/1582 (last visited June 7, 2005).
200. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
201. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In regarding the state's role the Court stated,
"The impact is greater when it has the sanction of law." Id. at 494.
202. 914 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990); rev'd United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
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racial characterization of its colleges and universities was due to the
freedom of choice of college students.2 °3 The school boards were
successful in Freemanv. Pitts2° andBoardofEducationof Oklahoma City
Public Schools, Independent School Dist.No. 89 v. Dowell.2 5 A unitary
school is one in which the racial identity of the school is determined
through the exercise of choice by students and their families rather than by
actions of the state.2 °6 Once unitary status is attained, the state is no longer
responsible for addressing the deep association of inferiority brought about
by its previous actions. Societal discrimination is the culprit and the state
is exculpated.
IlI. FREEDOM OF CHOICE AND THE SYSTEMS OF HIGHER EDUCATION

In 1963, a similar picture existed in the dual higher education system
of other southern states. 207 After Brown and the enactment of title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,208 these institutions were dubbed "Historically
Black Colleges and Universities" (HBCUs). Institutions designated for
whites are sometimes referred to as "Traditionally White Institutions"
(TWIs). While measures to change the pictures in TWIs have been the
subject of great public controversy, 2°9 policies and efforts to change the
picture in HBCUs have produced substantial litigation but little public
controversy.
The litigation to integrate HBCUs highlights the significance of student
choice in shaping the pictures in public institutions. Students choose from
among the institutions they apply to that offer them admission. More
importantly, the litigation demonstrates the role of the states in shaping
student choice. Prior to that litigation, the pictures in black colleges and

203. Ayers, 914 F.2d at 678.
204. Fordice,505 U.S. at 467.
205. 498 U.S. 237 (1991). See also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (holding that the
district court exceeded its power in ordering the school district to institute remedial measures).
206. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 634.
207. Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C. 1978). The then Department of Health,
Education and Welfare found ten states to be in violation of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
for ignoring requests to submit desegregation plans for their higher education systems or failing to
submit an acceptable desegregation plan. The ten states were Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Id. at
94.
208. 42 U.S.C. § 2000.
209. See infra Part III.
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universities looked like the picture in my classroom, except that faculty
may have been racially diverse. Similar to the public elementary and
secondary school systems, HBCUs were provided with less funding,
facilities, and other resources. The picture of HBCUs perpetuated the
association of blacks with inferiority. In southern systems, HBCUs were
the only option for blacks who wanted to attend a state college or
university. Under Brown, states could not restrict that choice but blacks
who wanted to attend a white college or university needed ajudicial decree
2
and the assistance of the federal government to enforce the court decree. "'
Notwithstanding the change in the law to integrate TWIs, blacks continue
to attend HBCUs. As in the case of elementary and secondary schools,
whites were not rushing to choose HBCUs. Accordingly, the litigation to
integrate HBCUs was directed at the implementation of measures to
induce white students to choose to attend them.
States established, operated, and maintained each state educational
institution. The DOJ's pursuit of policies to render the institutions as just
schools as opposed to schools with a racial character, was an attempt to
cease any determination of the racial character of institutions. However,
several factors affect the choice of prospective students in deciding to
attend those institutions. Those factors include missions, curriculums,
programs, quality of faculty, facilities, level of funding, historical status,
and proximity. Consequently, HBCUs are likely to remain as are TWIs.
Recognizing this reality, blacks sought remedies that would improve the
quality of HBCUs and the discontinuance of support for newly established
TWIs close to HBCUs. Those institutions drained resources that could
have been placed into HBCUs.
The litigation to change the pictures in HBCUs has not been advanced
by whites. Rather the cases have been brought by blacks seeking to end the
unequal treatment of HBCUs and the DOJ seeking to change the pictures
in HBCUs. In Knight v. James,211 the students, faculty, staff, and alumni
sued claiming that the establishment of two white state colleges offering
duplicate programs, after the establishment of a state HBCU in the same
city, violated the Fourteenth Amendment.212 They sought to merge the

210. See, e.g., Meredith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1962); Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp.
235 (N.D. Ala. 1955); United States v. Alabama, 628 F. Supp. 1137, 1141-42 (N.D. Ala. 1985);
Hunt v. Arnold, 172 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ga. 1959).
211. 514 F. Supp. 567 (M.D. Ala. 1981).
212. Id.
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white institutions into the HBCU.213 In United States v. Alabama,214 the
DOJ brought suit to require Alabama to desegregate its dual system of
higher education.215 The Court found that Alabama had not dismantled its
dual system and ordered the state to eliminate the vestiges of its dual
system. 16 The racial identifiability of student bodies, faculty, staff, and
governing boards was evidence of the continuing dual system. The Court
also found factors such as program duplications, degree offerings,
facilities, and funding. These factors demonstrate that freedom of choice
is a misnomer. Students choose among a limited number of options offered
by a state. States attempt to influence those choices by the mix of these
factors available within and among institutions. After the enactment of title
VI, states varied the missions and levels of funding offered by black and
white colleges so as to influence students to enroll in a way that continued
their status as HBCUs or TWls. Rather than equalize missions and funding
or dictate student choice as in the case of public schools, the Court
permitted tinkering with the many factors.
The plaintiffs were permitted to intervene2" 7 and subsequently in Knight
v. Alabama,218 the Court declined to merge TWIs into HBCUs. Such a
merger would infringe upon student choice. 2' 9 The Court also found that
the state's contemporary use of standardized test scores in the admission
process was permissible. 22' Alabama had a system in which its top tier
TWIs used standardized test scores and other TWIs and its HBCUs used
open admissions policies. 22 ' The Court distinguished between hard and soft
standards. It upheld the use of a soft standard in which the university of
Alabama and other TWIs used a sliding scale based on the combination of
test scores and grade point average as well as conditional admissions to
assure a diverse student body.222 These institutions would be an option for
more African-Americans. However, the Court struck down the hard
standard used by Auburn University that relied solely upon fixed test score
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Id. at 568.
Alabama, 628 F. Supp. at 1137.
Id. at 1140.
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benchmarks.223 The benchmarks were inflexible and applicants who did
not have the requisite scores were rejected.
The Court's holding was influenced by two notions. First, a state has
the right to offer educational options based upon the academic preparation
and abilities of students.224 That is, it could design a higher quality
program for students and select students based upon their likelihood of
success. Second, blacks were more likely to choose a school based upon
the quality of a student body relative to their own abilities. That factor was
more important than the historical racial character of an institution. 25
In 1968, Tennessee had established a dual system of higher education.
That system had not been dismantled through a freedom of choice
policy. 226 In that case, a group of black and white citizens sought to enjoin
the proposed construction and expansion of the University of TennesseeNashville (UTN) Center. 227 The plaintiffs argued that Tennessee had
established Tennessee State University (TSU) in Nashville for blacks and
that the state was continuing to maintain it as such. 228 By expanding UTN,
the state was offering whites an alternative state institution in Nashville.229
The expansion of UTN would attract whites who might otherwise choose
to attend TSU. 23 ° The DOJ joined the litigation and requested that the state
submit a plan for the desegregation of its dual system of higher
education.231 The district court denied the petition to enjoin the
construction and expansion, but ordered the defendants to submit a plan
of desegregation.232 In 1972, the district court held "that a dual system of
higher education which originated in the state law requiring separation of
the races is not dismantled as long as one overwhelmingly black state
233
institution remains surrounded by predominantly white state institution."
In Geier v. Blanton,23 4 the district court ordered that UTN and TSU be
223. Knight, 787 F. Supp. at 1166-67.
224. Id. at 1164.
225. Id. at 1058.
226. Sanders v. Ellington, 288 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Tenn. 1968). Despite freedom of choice,
black enrollment ranged from .6% to about 7% at traditionally white colleges and universities while
99% at TSU. Id. at 940.
227. Id. at 939.
228. Id. at 940.
229. See id. at 941.
230. See generally id. at 937.
231. Sanders, 288 F. Supp. at 939.
232. Id. at 941-42.
233. Geier v. Univ. of Tenn., 597 F.2d 1056, 1060 (6th Cir. 1979).
234. 427 F. Supp. 644 (M.D. Tenn. 1977).
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merged into a single institution.235 That decision was upheld in Geier v.
University of Tennessee.236 The surviving institution was to be TSU, a
historically black institution.237 While it survived in name and
administration, the resulting institution was an integrated institution with
nearly equal percentages of black and white students.
Similarly in Norris v. State Council of Higher Education for
Virginia,238 black faculty and students at Virginia State College challenged
the expansion of Richard Bland College from a two-year to a four-year
institution.239 Prior to Brown, Virginia law required its colleges and
universities to be racially segregated. 2 " After Brown, the state adopted a
freedom of choice policy for its higher education system.241
Notwithstanding the policy, 81% of the black students in the system
attended its two HBCUs while black student enrollment in TWIs ranged
from less than 2% to 7%.242 The HBCUs had difficulty attracting white
students.243 Furthermore, while the TWIs reported virtually no black
faculty at the time of the litigation, the HBCUs reported more success in
attracting white faculty than they did white students. 2 " If Richard Bland
College were transformed into a four-year institution, the state would be
providing white students with an alternative to Virginia State College.245
The court enjoined the expansion of Richard Bland College because it
would perpetuate the dual system but refused to order the merger of
Richard Bland College into Virginia State College.
Student choice plays a central role in the litigation over Mississippi's
dual system largely because the state's defense rested upon it. In 1975, the
parent of a student at Jackson State University an HBCU, sued for equal
funding and the dismantling of the dual system.246 The State of Mississippi
claimed that it was no longer maintaining a dual system of education after

235. Id. at 661.
236. Geier, 597 F.2d at 1056.
237. See id.at 1076-77 (Engel, J., dissenting).
238. 327 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1971).
239. Id.at 1369.
240. Id.at 1370.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Norris, 327 F. Supp. at 1370. Virginia State College reported that about three percent of
its student body was white at the time of the litigation. Id.
244. Id. at 1370.
245. Id.at 1371.
246. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
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the state dropped its racial designations in 1970.247 The state took this
position even though desegregation followed the same pattern under
freedom of choice plans in public schools. 248 A small percentage of black
students attended the historically white institutions and virtually no white
students chose to attend its HBCUs.249
Mississippi maintained that the racial character of its colleges and
universities in 1990 was the product of student choice rather than state
action. What the state overlooked was its actions in shaping the options
to students in its higher education system. Simultaneously with the
removal of racial designations, the state chose to set admission standards
based solely on standardized test scores. 25' The required scores at
historically white institutions were set at the level at which most whites
scored above and most blacks scored below.252 The admission standards
at its HBCUs were significantly lower. 253 Thus, most whites were offered
the option of attending any institution in the state and most blacks were
only offered the option of attending HBCUs.254 Much of the litigation
involved remedies that influenced student choice. As black public schools
were under financed, had comparatively inadequate facilities and had less
qualified faculties, few whites could be expected to choose HBCUs.
The Supreme Court held that Mississippi was still in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 255 The Court addressed the state's obligations
under the Fourteenth Amendment in the aftermath of its abrogation of the
state's racial classification of its educational institutions.256 It held that "[a]
state does not discharge its constitutional obligations until it eradicates
policies and practices traceable
to its prior de jure dual system that
' 257
continue to foster segregation.
The Court distinguished the role of choice in higher education from
that in the case of elementary and secondary schools.
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[W]e do not disagree with the Court of Appeals' observation
that a state university system is quite different in very relevant
respects from primary and secondary schools. Unlike attendance at
the lower level schools, a student's decision to seek higher
education has been a matter of choice. The State historically has not
assigned students to a particular institution.258
The Court recognized that Mississippi restricted the choices ofprospective
students in the same manner it had when it designated the racial character
of its institutions through admissions policies, duplication of programs,
missions, and number of institutions. 9
The combination of these four factors limited the options provided by
the state from which students could choose. First, admission standards
determined which of the eight institutions a student could choose.
Standardized test scores were established at levels so most whites could
choose from among all institutions, but most blacks could only choose
from a smaller set of institutions, primarily those that had been designated
for blacks under the formal racial classification system. Second, the
assignment of missions and duplication of programs assured that most
whites would continue to prefer TWIs. The Fordiceruling presumes that
it is possible for a state with a past history of dual race systems to
transform into a single system possessing a racial character not dictated by
the state. However, the solution must seek to broaden the choice of black
students and encourage white students to select HBCUs.
On remand, the district court fashioned such a remedy.26 ° The two
pillars of the settlement rested on revised admission standards and
scholarships for white students. The district court established the same
admission standards of all state institutions so that a significant number of
blacks could choose TWIs.26 ' It ordered the creation of diversity
scholarships to attract white students to HBCUs.26 2 In the school year
following the settlement, black freshman enrollment in all Mississippi
258. Id. at 728-29.
259. Id. at 732-43.
260. See Ayers v. Fordice, 879 F. Supp. 1419 (M.D. Ms. 1995).
261. Id. Students were not to be evaluated based solely on standardized test scores but instead
were to be evaluated on a variety of factors, including high school grades, class rank, teacher
evaluations and test scores. High school graduates with at least a 3.2 grade point average were to
be automatically admitted to any Mississippi institution. A sliding scale based on grade point
average and test scores were to be used for students with a grade point average less than 3.2.
262. Id.
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colleges decreased; most of that decrease occurred at HBCUs. 263
Furthermore, there was some evidence that more blacks were choosing to
attend TWIs. 26 In United States v. Louisiana,265 Health, Education and
Welfare and its successor, the Department of Education, continued to
pursue the implementation of a desegregation plan.266 The DOJ brought
suit against Louisiana in 1974 arguing that the state was maintaining a dual
system of higher education based upon race. 267 The state entered into a
consent decree in 1981.268 When the DOJ sought compliance with the
consent decree in 1987, the state acknowledged that it had not fully
implemented the consent decree and that its colleges and universities
remain racially identifiable. 269 After the enactment of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the state discontinued the racial designation of its colleges and
universities and adopted a freedom of choice admissions policy in which
a Louisiana high school graduate could attend any Louisiana institution of
higher education that he or she chose. 27 0 Notwithstanding the change in
policy, as of 1988, the four institutions established as black schools
remained predominantly black and the eleven institutions established as
white schools remained predominantly white.27' In fact, the enrollment of
white students at the HBCUs only increased slightly between 1981 and
1987 and the enrollment of blacks at the TWIs decreased noticeably during
the same period.272
The Fifth Circuit interpreted Fordiceto say that an institution that has
a racial identity is not automatically a constitutional violation.27 3 The
picture of the institution after a state disavows its official racial

263. Racial and Ethnic Tensions inAmerican Communities: Poverty, Inequality, and
Discrimination - Volume VII: The Mississippi Delta Report, ch. 2 Race and the Public Education
System in Mississippi, available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/msdelta/ch2.htm (last visited June
7, 2005).
264. Id.
265. 9 F.3d 1159, 1164 (5th Cir. 1993).
266. Order Denying Motion to Stay, 815 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. La. 1993); Opinion and Order,
718 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. La. 1989); Order on Summary Judgment Motion and Reasons, 692 F. Supp.
642 (E.D. La. 1988); Order Approving Consent Decree, 527 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. La. 1981).
267. Order and Reasons, 692 F. Supp. at 643-44.
268. OrderApproving Consent Decree, 527 F. Supp. at 509.
269. Order and Reasons, 692 F. Supp. at 644.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 644-45.
272. Id. at 645.
273. United States v. Louisiana, 9 F.3d 1159, 1164 (1993) (citing United States v. Fordice, 505
U.S. 717 (1992)).
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classification is not relevant because individual choice may be a major
factor in bringing about that racial character. Rather, specific state policies
and practices must be examined to determine whether the state has
dismantled its dual system or whether state action is the cause of the
continuing racial identity.274 In Fordice,for example, Mississippi followed
HEW guidelines and assigned its existing institutions specific racially
neutral missions in 198 L27' The plaintiffs maintained that these missions
were designed to lock the dual system into place and to continue to treat
black institutions unequally.27 6 The University of Mississippi and
Mississippi State University, two major white institutions, were designated
as comprehensive research institutions. Jackson State, the major black
institution, was designated as an urban university.277 The comprehensive
research institutions were to continue receiving favored treatment under
the law.27 If all institutions continued to have their same racial identities,
was Mississippi continuing to operate a dual system? According to the
U.S. Supreme Court, this depended upon the279actions taken by the state to
end its determination of that racial identity.
According to the Justice Department, actions to provide equal funding
and treatment of Jackson State and other HBCUs would be a constitutional
violation because equal treatment would tend to preserve the racial identity
of black schools, rather than then being just a school. 28" This would occur
because equal treatment of black institutions would cause blacks that
would have opted to attend the better financed white institution to prefer
black institutions.28 '
In United States v. Louisiana,8 2 the Fifth Circuit held that "each
suspect state policy or practice [must be] analyzed to determine whether
it is traceable to the prior de jure system, whether it continues to foster
segregation, whether it lacks sound educational justification and whether
its elimination is practicable. 2 3 The trial court found that Louisiana failed
to meet the Fordice standard by the state's "open admissions policy and
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program duplication in proximate institutions." 2 The state's hand in
shaping the racial identities of its educational institutions was particularly
indicated by "the coexistence of predominantly black institutions and
predominantly white institutions in close geographic proximity in four
areas of the state. 285 Under Louisiana's open admissions policy, students
were free to choose any institution, but the state provided the option to
attend TWls or HBCUs.28 6 Just as the black students in elementary and
secondary schools, blacks at the college level continued to choose lesser
financed and maintained institutions. Furthermore, whites were unlikely
to choose to attend those schools. By providing two sets of institutions
with duplicate programs, the state was not dismantling its dual system.287
Justice Thomas has twice argued for the preservation of HBCUs.288 In
his concurrence in Fordice,Justice Thomas emphasized his belief that the
Fordicestandard did not require the destruction of the all black picture.289
Today, we hold that "[i]fpolicies traceable to the dejure system are
still in force and have discriminatory effects, those policies too
must be reformed to the extent practicable and consistent with
sound educational practices.... I agree that this statement defines
the appropriate standard to apply in the higher education context. I
write separately to emphasize that this standard is far different from
the one adopted to govern the grade school context... In particular,
because it does not compel the elimination of all observed racial
imbalance, it portends neither the destruction of historically black
colleges nor the severing of those institutions from their distinctive
histories and traditions. ' 2 °
Justice Thomas further noted that states may have a sound educational
policyjustification for maintaining historically black colleges. 291 However,
284. Id. at 1165.
285. Id.
286. See id.
287. See Louisiana, 9 F.3d at 1159.
288. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717,745-49 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring); see
also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 378-87 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
289. Fordice,505 U.S. at 745 (Thomas, J., concurring).
290. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
291. Id. at 747-48 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas did not address the issue of
whether a sound educational policy could justify a state's provision of a predominantly white
institution. Id. at 745-49 (Thomas, J., concurring); see Wendy Brown-Scott, Race-Consciousness
in Higher Education: Does "Sound EducationalPolicy" Support the Continued Existence of
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Justice Thomas did not address whether offering an HBCU as a sound
educational policy requires a state to provide equal funding of those
institutions.29
In a recent dissent in Grutterv. Bollinger,Justice Thomas retreats from
293 He
his embrace of the sound educational policy standard of Fordice.
chides the majority for not acknowledging a growing body of scholarly
studies that show that racially homogenous student bodies benefit the
educational development of blacks, while integration impairs the learning
of black students.294 Moreover, Justice Thomas argues that the majority's
acceptance of diversity, because of its educational benefits, would permit
states to exclude whites from HBCUs because blacks attain educational
benefits from racial homogeneity.295 Justice Thomas's statements in
Grutterraise the question of whether he is disavowing the position he took
in Fordice.If he is not, it is unclear what Justice Thomas meant when he
expressed his view in Fordice that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
require destruction of HBCUs. 96 Moreover, Justice Thomas clearly sees
HBCUs as identified by more than their historical function, but also by the
skin color of the students in such institutions.297 Justice Thomas's Grutter
analysis raises the question of how HBCUs can continue if a state does not
offer an option that more blacks are likely to choose than nonblacks.298
Yet, Justice Thomas insists that it is unconstitutional for a state to make
the picture relevant in setting its educational goals.299

IV. OPTIONS AND THE TRADITIONALLY WHITE INSTITUTIONS

(TWIs)

Courts have severely limited the power of states to change the picture
of TWIs in and outside the South. Courts have been receptive to reverse
discrimination actions brought by whites to resist voluntary measures by
colleges and universities to integrate. First, the U.S. Supreme Court has
HistoricallyBlack Colleges?, 43 EMORY L.J. 1 (1994).
292. Justice Antonin Scalia in his concurrence expressed his view that equal funding of
HBCUs would perpetuate segregation and therefore was unconstitutional, thus proffering a separate
and unequal doctrine. Id. at 759 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
293. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 378-87 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
294. See id.
295. See id.
296. See Fordice, 505 U.S. at 745 (Thomas, J., concurring).
297. See id.
298. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 378-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 386-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

THE PICTURE OF EQUALTY

held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit states to remedy the
effects of societal discrimination. 0 In Croson v. City of Richmond,3", a
case involving industry rather than educational institutions, the Court held
that state institutions could not voluntarily change the picture because it
was created by societal discrimination rather than specific state action.30 2
Secondly, prior to Grutter,the Court refused to permit white institutions
outside the South to use race based affirmative action admission policies
to alleviate the effects of historical discrimination in the absence of
specific conduct by the state.30 3 In Regents of the University of California
at Davis v. Bakke,3°4 the U.S. Supreme Court was asked whether a state
institution without a history of past discrimination could voluntarily
change the picture within classrooms in its professional schools. 305 In a
split decision, the Court permitted moderate changes in the picture based
upon educational policies rather than race. 6 In Justice Powell's famous
opinion, he explained that states could take race into account to attain a
diverse student body.30 7
The Supreme Court has never accepted a challenge to an affirmative
action admissions policy involving an institution of higher education from
the South. It denied certiorari in Hopwood v. University of Texas,3°8 a case
in which white applicants objected to the steps taken by the University of
Texas School of Law to change its historical picture.30 9 In crafting its
affirmative action admissions policy, the University of Texas sought to
achieve a student body comprised of approximately ten percent Mexican
Americans and five percent African-Americans. 310 The law school offered
two basic rationales for the policy: the historical discrimination in the
entire Texas educational system and the benefits of a diverse student
body.31' In finding the policy and practice unconstitutional, the Fifth
Circuit stated, "The use of race, in and of itself, to choose students simply
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' The Court rejected the
achieves a student body that looks different."312
diversity rationale for the admissions policy and went to considerable
lengths to dispel a causal connection between the policy and past
discrimination by the State of Texas. It further asserted that the racial
law school, condemned in Sweatt v.
discriminatory practices of the
3" 3 ended in the 1960s. 3 14
Painter,
The Eleventh Circuit took a similar approach in Johnson v. Board of
Regents of University of Georgia,3 15 in which three unsuccessful white
applicants sued the University of Georgia (UGA) over its affirmative
action program designed to increase the number of African-American
students.3 16 The program had been implemented as part of a desegregation
plan UGA was ordered to adopt by the Office of Civil Rights (OCR).3 17
Prior to 1961, no African-American had attended UGA.318 In 1969, the
OCR determined that the Georgia university system was still operating a
dual system and ordered the Board of Regents to adopt a desegregation
plan and affirmative action programs to alleviate the vestiges of
discrimination.3" 9 In 1989, the OCR informed the Board of Regents that
the university system "had substantially complied with the prescribed
remedial measures and therefore 'Georgia's system of public higher
education is now in compliance with Title VI, and no additional
desegregation measures will be required. '30 However, it required Georgia
to remain in compliance and to avoid discrimination on the basis of race,
color, or national origin.,, 321 The case was not appealed to the Supreme
Court.
While the diversity rationale may have been a pretext for the Texas
educational system to justify an admissions policy developed to remedy
past discrimination, the University of Michigan presented an admissions
policy clearly driven by diversity considerations. Under the diversity
rationale, the changing of the picture has been divorced from notions of
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equality.322 While the picture is not important, the interactions in the
institutions are.32 3 In general, diversity promotes measured, perhaps
modest, changes to the picture. In any case, there would be something
wrong with the picture of the all black classroom, which was completely
devoid of racial diversity. Justice Thomas's opposition to affirmative
action may rest on this result. Justice Thomas would probably find nothing
wrong with the picture of an all black classroom. It may not be equal to a
classroom with all whites today, but it can never be equal unless it is
allowed to exist and flourish.
Consistent with the rationale of Knight v. Alabama, the State of
Michigan was entitled to design a program of legal education for students
possessing high levels of skill and ability. In doing so, the state could
expect prospective students to choose a school based on the perceived
quality of that program. The state also had an interest in selecting students
for the program who were more likely to be successful within the program.
"The hallmark of [its] policy [was] its focus on academic ability coupled
with a flexible assessment of the applicants' talents, experiences, and the
potential to contribute to the learning of those around them. 324 The law
school appears to have developed its admission policy based upon a
determination that the success of qualified minority students would be
enhanced by the matriculation of a significant number of minority
students. That significant number was called a critical mass.325 Moreover,
it could have also concluded that the success of nonminority students
would not be enhanced without a critical mass of minority students. The
majority's recognition of this as a compelling state interest was consistent
with its rationale in Fordice that the racial picture of an institution was
constitutionally permissible if justified by sound educational policy.326
As shown in the discussion of Knight v. Alabama and Fordice,the use
of standardized test scores as part of the criteria used in the admissions

322. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
323. See id.
324. Id.at 315.
325. Id.The University of Michigan Law School designed its admissions process consciously
to attain a student body that it considered to be racially and ethnically diverse. To reach that goal,
it sought to admit and retain a "critical mass" ofAfrican-American, Hispanic, and Native American
students. By critical mass, the law school meant that number of minority students "that encourages
underrepresented minority students to participate in the classroom and not feel isolated." Id.at 318.
It also designed the program to "bring to the Law School a perspective different from that of
members of groups which have not been discriminated against." Id.at 319.
326. Id. at 328.
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process produces racial effects. Under Fordice, racially identifiable
institutions resulting from the use of such tests are constitutionally
permissible if such use is justified by sound educational policy. If a state
may offer racially identifiable institutions using admissions criteria
justified by sound educational policy, why are admission practices
designed to achieve a racially diverse student body also permissible when
justified by sound educational policy? Grutter says they may be; Gratz v.
Bollinger,3 27 the case pertaining to undergraduate admissions decided with
Grutter, says they are not.
The analysis challenges two phases of the admission process. In the
admission policy establishment phase, a university determines the criteria
it will use to evaluate applicants. In the consideration stage, a university
selects from among its applicants by evaluating them using those criteria.
The argument of the plaintiffs in Hopwood and Grutteris that the state has
an obligation to refrain from adopting admissions policies intending to
favor a particular race in the establishment phase or to intentionally apply
a racially neutral admissions to favor a particular race in the consideration
stage. It is permissible, however, to adopt a racially neutral policy in the
establishment phase that the state knows will favor a particular race in the
consideration stage. The plaintiffs apparently attempted to draw a
distinction between a policy and application process the state intends to
have racial effects from one that it merely knows will have racial effects.
Under their arguments, it is perfectly acceptable for a state to establish an
admission policy that it knows will favor white applicants as long as it did
not intend them. For example, in Fordice,when Mississippi dropped the
racial classification of its institutions in 1970, it adopted an admissions
policy using standardized test scores as the sole criterion.32 The required
scores for the state's TWIs were set levels at which most whites scored
above and most blacks scored below.329 The required scores for HBCUs
were set considerably lower.33 ' Alabama followed a similar practice but
used soft rather than hard standards.33 ' Both states used admission criteria
to limit the higher education option it made available to prospective black
applicants.332 Most black applicants would not be eligible for admission to
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the institutions that were provided the states' best resources. The plaintiffs
in Grutter3 33 and Hopwood 34 had no objection to the state discriminating
in the options it made available to minority applicants.335 Given the limited
number of slots available, any admissions policy that gave black or
minority applicants a real chance at selection would have reduced the
probability of their selection.336
Justice Thomas strongly suggests that knowingly establishing
admissions criteria that produces racially disparate results is
unconstitutional.337 However, he then states that once the institution
decides to use an impermissible method 3 at
stage one, it can not then select
38
in a racially disparate way in stage tWo.
In Knight v. Alabama, the Court acknowledged that the existence of a
racial identity was inevitable.339 It permitted soft standards because they
were inclusive. It prohibited hard standards using standardized test scores
because they were exclusive. Grutterpermitted a soft inclusive diversity
standard and Gratz disallowed a hard diversity standard presumably
because it was exclusive on its face. Soft standards emphasize the
consideration phase rather than the policy establishment phase. Although
the law school did not rely upon the history of racial disparities in the
Michigan public school systems, the interveners made such claims.34 ° The
existence of such a history was an issue in Knight v. Alabama.

V. CONCLUSION

The separate but equal doctrine needed to be eliminated and Brown34 '
did just that. Now, the time has come to unshackle our thinking about
racial equality from the chains of the separate but equal doctrine. This
doctrine has confused us far more than it has provided us with a reliable
measure of racial equality. It is naive to believe that if the law only
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334. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
335. See supratext accompanying notes 333-34 and cases cited.
336. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306.
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disavows the doctrine of separate but equal over and over again, some day
racial equality will emerge. Colorblind legal principles have not only not
led to the dissipation of the inequality between the pictures legitimized by
the separate but equal doctrine, such principles have furthered that
legitimacy. Pictures of the racial composition of educational institutions
are going to exist in this country tomorrow and twenty-five years from
now. Despite all the litigation, all the lofty U.S. Supreme Court odes to
racial equality, there is still something wrong with the all black picture.
Will the Court permit democracy and its educational institutions to tackle
the removal of the deep ingrained association of dark skins with inferiority
or will it leave the task to American society as it has since the founding of
the Court?

